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Abstract
The repeat-sales model controls quality by utilizing the transacted prices
of the same items in diﬀerent time periods. However, this methodology suf-
fers from non-randomness of the data, implying that a sample based only on
repeat-sales items may not represent the population of properties. To address
this potential problem, the Heckman two-stage procedure has been applied
to a sample of Picasso prints over the period 1988-1995 as registered in the
1995 edition of the Mayer International Auction Records on CD-ROM. Em-
pirical evidence shows that the selection corrected repeat-sales model yields
substantially better goodness of ﬁt than the estimated standard repeat-sales
speciﬁcation.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The repeat-sales model controls quality by utilizing the transacted prices of the
same property in diﬀerent time periods [Bailey et al., 1963; Ashenfelter and Graddy,
2003]. Provided that property characteristics and the relative price structure do not
change between sales, the price diﬀerences can be solely explained by time dummies.
Although the method avoids the diﬃculty of explicitly specifying the relevant quality
characteristics, such as the case for hedonic approach, it does so at the cost of ignoring
all information on single transactions. An attempt to use all the information by
jointly estimating conventional hedonic and repeat sales models is to combine sale
and repeat sales in a system of equations [Case and Quigley, 1991; Carter Hill et
al., 1997; Locatelli and Zanola, 2005]. This methodology encompasses previous
techniques since it combines information on repeat sales with hedonic approach,
which allows to capture either the increase and/or the depreciation of prices within
the repeat sales model and the serial correlation in hedonic data. However, this
methodology does not allow to take into account the sample selection bias which
arises in focusing on repeat sales only. In fact, repeat-sales indexes suﬀer from non-
randomness of the data, implying that a sample based only on repeat-sales items
may not represent the population of properties.
To address the potential problem of sample selection bias, in this paper I apply
the Heckman two-stage procedure to a sample of Picasso prints over the period 1988-
1995 as registered in the 1995 edition of the Mayer International Auction Records
on CD-ROM. The procedure calls for the estimation of a probit model predicting
whether an item is a repeat-sales item or is sold only one time within the analyzed
period. Probit estimates are used to construct the inverse Mills ratio, which is used
2as an explanatory variable into the estimation of the repeat sales equation in order
to obtain consistent estimates and provide a test for the presence of sample-selection
bias. Hence, data on single and repeat-salesh a v eb e e nu s e df o rt h ec o n s t r u c t i o no f
the price index as a whole, rather than restricted to the transactions which actually
occur twice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the theoretical
model. The dataset is described in Section 3. Results are presented in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
32 The Model
The repeat-sales index method, initially proposed by Bailey et al. (1963), follows
the changes in value of re-sold prints. It provides an alternative estimation method
to hedonic price index method based on price changes of prints sold more than once.
In fact, repeat-sales methods have been developed to abstract from measuring the
hedonic characteristics of items. More generally, the repeat-sales method can be
viewed as an extension of the explicit inter-temporal model when the same art item
is observed to be sold more than once.
Assuming the characteristics and the implicit prices of the same print do not
change between the ﬁrst sale and the second sale, the price diﬀerence between two
sales of the same print may be expressed as:
pit+s − pit =
T X
t=1
βtDit +( εit+s − εit) (1)
where pit denotes the sales price of print i in period t.w i t h t + s>t ; βt is a
parameter; Dit is a set of time dummy variables equal to −1 in period, +1 in period
t+s,z e r oo t h e r w i s e ;a n dεit is the random error term, which is normally distributed.
When the assumption of unchanged print characteristics is not violated, as it is
in this case, the advantage of the repeat-sales method is that such characteristics
do not need to be estimated in order to calculate an art price index. However, it
drives several disadvantages, including the non-randomness of the sample, reductions
in sample size, selectivity, non-applicability to a single cross-sectional comparisons
[Haurin and Hendershott, 1991].
Attempts at solving these problems focus on hybrid models, which combine in-
formation on repeat sale with hedonic approach [Case and Quigley, 1991; Carter Hill
et al., 1997; Locatelli and Zanola, 2005]. However, also this methodology fails to
directly solve the sample selection problem. In particular, in the case of repeat-sales
model a double selection problem emerges. First, with infrequent repeat sales, the
4sample sizes is quite small and it does not represent the population of properties.
Secondly, selection bias may also arise when second sales bring previously omitted
ﬁrst-sale data into the sample.
To address the double selection bias, the Heckmann (1974, 1979) two-step proce-
dure for correcting for sample selection bias derived by is integrated for constructing
an unbiased price index when items are sold twice [Gatzlaﬀ and Haurin, 1997; Hwang
and Quigley, 2004]. Following Heckman (1979), the ﬁrst step of the procedure calls
for the estimation of a probit model predicting whether an art item is sold twice or
not. Let Iit be an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the print i is sold









where Φ is the standard normal distribution; Zmit are the relevant hedonic charac-
teristics (m =1 .....M) of the print i at time t;a n dγ is a set of parameters. In the
second step, the inverse Mills ratio, λit = φ(γZit)/Φ(γZit),w h e r eφ is the standard
normal density, is included as independent variable in equation (1) to yield unbiased
price index, thereby correcting for the non-randomness of sample selection:
pit+s − pit =
T X
t=1
βtDit + χ(λit+s − λit)+( εit+s − εit) (3)
where χ is a parameter to be estimated.
53D a t a
Data is drawn from auctions held during the period 1987-1995 as reported in the
1995 edition of the Mayer International Auction Records on CD-Rom, which contains
records of Picasso prints sold at the world’s major auctions. As noted by Pesando and
Shum (1996), due to the homogeneous quality and condition of the impressions I only
focus on Picasso prints, which also closely resemble price movements in the market
for modern prints as a whole. Each print is described by a number of characteristics.
Prices are gross of the buyers and sellers’ transaction fees paid to auction prints and
are recorded in both local currency and US dollars. This last (US) currency has
been used for performing estimates. Sales are assumed to occur at the end of each
period.
The Probit model is estimated with a total of 1,665 Picasso prints. To this aim,
the physical variables include the surface of the print, dim, as well as the squared
surface, dim2; the total number of copies produced of the same print, n_print;a
dummy variable to take into account if prints are signed, sign, with value of 1 if
prints are signed, and 0 otherwise; a dummy variable is introduced to take into
account if prints are coloured, colour, with value of 1 if prints have more than one
color, and 0 otherwise; a set of dummy variables, reﬂecting the technique adopted:
etching, etch; litho, litho (excluded variable); drypoint, dry; aquatint or eau-forte,
aqua; linocut, lino; and all other media, other.
For the purpose of this study, auction houses where prints are sold must be
also included as the relevant characteristics of i-prints. Sotheby’s and Christie’s are
known to be the leading auction houses in this kind of transaction while the most
important art auction markets are New York and London. In order to depict precisely
the geographical structure of both the market and the auction house, I consider some
city and auction house pairs. In particular, several dummies are taken into account
6as follows: sothny,f o rS o t h e b y ’ sN e wY o r k ;sothlon, for Sotheby’s London; chriny,
for Christie’s New York; chrilon, for Christie’s London; francall, for print sold in
France; germany, for prints sold in Germany; otherus, for prints sold in US but not
in New York; othereu, for prints sold in the European countries not mentioned before;
world, all other salerooms and cities of sales; swiss, for prints sold in Switzerland
(excluded variable).
Finally, a set of dummy variables, Dt,w i t ht = 1988,......,1995, are introduced
for each semester between 1988:I and 1995:II (with 1988:I excluded). Clearly, the
meaning of time dummies is diﬀerent for single and repeat sales. In the case of single
sales, the dummy variables are +1 if the sale occurs that semester, zero otherwise.
In the case of repeat sales the dummy variables are −1 at the time of the ﬁrst sale
of the asset; +1 at time of the second sale of the asset; and zero otherwise. Table 1
describes the main features of the dataset.
[TABLE 1]
Sales which are one of a repeat-sales pair accounts for 174 sales; this constitutes
the 10.45 per cent of the total sample, which is consistent with similar studies on
repeat-sales items [Case and Szymanoski, 1995; Munneke and Slade, 2000; Hwang
and Quigley, 2004]. As usual for the repeat-sales sub-samples, inspection of Table 1
reveals some substantial diﬀerences between the characteristics of the total sample
versus the characteristics of the data having sold twice.
74R e s u l t s
In this section, the results from the repeat-sales models described in Section 2 are
compared. The probit model relates whether a print is sold twice to a number of
characteristics.
[TABLE 2]
As reported in Table 2, the probability of sales of a print in any semester in-
terval diﬀers for prints with diﬀerent characteristics. A number of coeﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcative, a heartening result in view of what might be regarded as
the foolhardy strategy of including such a large array of variables (Steele and Goy,
1997).
In any case, the primary concern is not with coeﬃcients of characteristics; but
rather with the estimation of the inverse Mills ratio of both the ﬁrst and the second
sale to be used in equation (3). Two alternative semi-annual repeat-sales index
estimates are reported in Table 3: the standard repeat-sales index, and the selection
corrected repeat-sales index based on equation (1) and (3), respectively.
[TABLE 3]
Columns (1) and (2) present respectively the coeﬃcients and the standard de-
viations for the standard repeat-sales index. The standard repeat-sales index, to
be used as benchmark, uses information from only the sold properties and it does
not control for selection bias. Columns (3) and (4) show the results of the selected
repeat sales method. The selection corrected repeat-sales model is constructed from
the estimation of equation (3) and includes in the estimation λit and λit+s.
The Wald test assumption of the null of all coeﬃcients in the regression (ex-
cept the constant) being 0 is rejected. Furthermore, the likelihood-ratio test is also
computed. It compares the joint likelihood of an independent probit model for the
8selection equation and a regression model on the observed hammer price data against
the Heckman model likelihood. The z = −1.56 and χ2 of 2.44 are diﬀerent from zero,
justify the Heckman selection equation with this data.
We are now in the position to evaluate the selection corrected repeat-sales index.
A common way of comparing the goodness of ﬁt of two or more econometric models
for the same dependent variable is to compare the estimated standard deviation of
the disturbance term. This is a direct measure of the degree of variation in the
dependent variable not explained by the econometric model: the smaller estimated
standard deviation of disturbance is, the better the explanatory power of the model.
Table 4 compares the estimated standard deviation of the disturbance terms. The
selection corrected repeat-sales model yields substantially smaller estimate of the
estimated standard deviation of the repeat-sales speciﬁcation.
[TABLE 4]
A second measure used to compare hammer price models is the width of the
conﬁdence interval around the predicted price of an average print. It reﬂects the
precision with which the individual parameters of the model are estimated using
a speciﬁc econometric model. In particular, since the width is closely related to
the estimated standard deviation of the estimated parameters, it follows that the
corrected repeat-sales model is expected to have smaller conﬁdence interval than
corresponding repeat-sales model. Table 5 display the width of a 95 percent conﬁ-
dence interval estimated around the predicted price of a representative print. Results
show the same patterns observed for the estimated standard deviation of the dis-
turbance term. Speciﬁcally, the corrected repeat-sales model is more precise than
the repeat-sales model yielding a narrow conﬁdence interval than the repeat-sales
model.
[TABLE 5]
9Finally, a third measure used to assess the relative precision of each hammer
price models is the correlation between the actual and predicted values of all prop-
erties included in the dataset. It provides a direct measure of the reliability with
which the price of each print can be predicted from the econometric model [Case
and Szymanoski, 1995]. Again, the corrected repeat-sales model displays a higher
correlation value (0.64) than the repeat-sales model (0.62).
105C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper suggests and tests a methodology to solve the non-randomness of the
data which biases the repeat-sales hammer price indexes. To correct for this type of
sample selection bias requires application of a two-step procedure for correcting for
sample selection bias derived by Heckmann, the so-called selection corrected repeat-
sales index. Estimates of the ﬁrst-stage sample selection equation show that the
likelihood of sale is inﬂuenced by a number of hedonic characteristics. Second-stage
estimates of the hammer price index equation reveal the signiﬁcance of the potential
bias. In particular, using a sample of Picasso prints sold at auctions during the period
1987-1995, I ﬁnd that the selection corrected repeat-sales model yields substantially
better goodness of ﬁt than the estimated standard repeat-sales speciﬁcation.
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics 1988-1995    
       
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. Min.  Max. 
A. Single Sales (N = 1665) 
price (in $)  19925.78  45974.64 200.00 940.000.00 
dim 1.855.44  1.635.92 36.40 31.520.31 
n_print 90.60  103.09 2.00 1000 
sig 0.84  0.37 0.00 1.00 
colour 0.21  0.41 0.00 1.00 
etch 0.38  0.48 0.00 1.00 
dry 0.09  0.29 0.00 1.00 
aqua 0.07  0.25 0.00 1.00 
lino 0.18  0.38 0.00 1.00 
other 0.02  0.13 0.00 1.00 
litho 0.27  0.44 0.00 1.00 
sothny 0.28  0.45 0.00 1.00 
sothlon 0.17  0.37 0.00 1.00 
chriny 0.13  0.33 0.00 1.00 
chrilon 0.11  0.32 0.00 1.00 
francall 0.08  0.26 0.00 1.00 
germany 0.07  0.25 0.00 1.00 
otherus 0.04  0.20 0.00 1.00 
othereu 0.03  0.17 0.00 1.00 
world 0.02  0.15 0.00 1.00 
swiss 0.06  0.24 0.00 1.00 
litho 0.27  0.44 0.00 1.00 
D88:I 0.06  0.23 -1.00 1.00 
D88:II 0.08  0.26 -1.00 1.00 
D89:I 0.09  0.29 -1.00 1.00 
D89:II 0.06  0.24 -1.00 1.00 
D90:I 0.11  0.32 -1.00 1.00 
D90:II 0.04  0.19 -1.00 1.00 
D91:I 0.04  0.20 -1.00 1.00 
D91:II 0.02  0.14 -1.00 1.00 
D92:I 0.05  0.23 -1.00 1.00 
D92:II 0.04  0.20 -1.00 1.00 
D93:I 0.07  0.26 -1.00 1.00 
D93:II 0.04  0.20 -1.00 1.00 
D94:I 0.07  0.25 0.00 1.00 
D94:II 0.08  0.27 -1.00 1.00 
D95:I 0.11  0.31 -1.00 1.00 
D95:II 0.04  0.19 0.00 1.00 
      15
B.Repeat Sales (NR = 174 =87 Pairs) 
Pricet 47,898.79  65,090.39 1,600 378,790 
Price(t+s) 42,484.71  62,546.26 2,660 340,000 
D88:I -0.10  0.31 -1.00 0.00 
D88:II -0.07  0.43 -1.00 1.00 
D89:I -0.13  0.40 -1.00 1.00 
D89:II -0.01  0.42 -1.00 1.00 
D90:I -0.01  0.52 -1.00 1.00 
D90:II 0.01  0.39 -1.00 1.00 
D91:I 0.06  0.49 -1.00 1.00 
D91:II 0.05  0.30 -1.00 1.00 
D92:I 0.13  0.37 -1.00 1.00 
D92:II 0.02  0.21 -1.00 1.00 
D93:I -0.07  0.30 -1.00 1.00 
D93:II -0.05  0.21 -1.00 0.00 
D94:I 0.02  0.15 0.00 1.00 
D94:II 0.00  0.22 -1.00 1.00 
D95:I 0.06  0.32 -1.00 1.00 
D95:II 0.09  0.29 0.00 1.00 
   16
   
TABLE 2. Probit model of probability of sale in any semester 1988-
1995 
 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Err. 
dim -0.0001877  0.0000712 
dim2 7.59e-09  2.49e-09 
n_print -0.0000852  0.0007144 
sig -0.564836  0.1536888 
colour 0.5053757  0.1990067 
etch -0.1771685  0.1778357 
dry -0.9051219  0.3164198 
aqua -0.1253712  0.23781 
lino -0.8295855  0.2609411 
other -0.3521777  0.385609 
sothny -0.368279  0.2233228 
sothlon -0.2922498  0.2424772 
chriny -0.3374871  0.2490545 
chrilon -0.5255215  0.3212364 
francall 0.6527007  0.2433742 
germany -0.6212671  0.2989248 
otherus 0.2939351  0.2826532 
othereu -0.2978218  0.3683248 
world -0.1663604  0.4143306 
Notes. The model also contains time dummy variables for each semester from 1988:I through 
1995:II. Results are computated on 1.665 Picasso prints. */**/*** significance at 1%. 5%. 10%. 
respectively. 
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TABLE 3. Alternative repeat-sales price indexes for Picasso prints 
        
   Repeat-sales Price Model 
Selection Corrected Repeat-
Sales Price Model 
Variable Coef.  Rob. Std. 
Err.  Coef.  Rob. Std. 
Err. 
D88:II  0.1323445 0.1733751 0.2013921 0.1275404 
D89:I  0.2491968 0.2119746 0.3347066 0.1731244 
D89:II 0.6709973*  0.2049776  0.7923346  0.1727835 
D90:I 0.5014519*  0.2019792  0.6959125  0.2244966 
D90:II 0.4805644**  0.2152113  0.7074705  0.2930297 
D91:I 0.3860939***  0.2065482  0.6265385  0.2362956 
D91:II 0.3512677  0.2628176  0.67828  0.3865739 
D92:I -0.1803018  0.2046352  0.1056281  0.2598114 
D92:II -0.1962179  0.325501  0.2262526  0.4020587 
D93:I -0.6282793***  0.3334847  -0.2683778  0.3510804 
D93:II -0.8803559**  0.4372302  -0.5135032  0.4010293 
D94:I -0.6466308  0.4913997  -0.1363724  0.4434488 
D94:II -0.4171771  0.3464526  -0.0280528  0.340588 
D95:I -0.5911461**  0.2990719  -0.129798  0.3889912 
D95:II   -0.7359309**  0.3664381   -0.2046299  0.4490041 
    
Wald chi2(15)  115.74  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Likelihood-ratio test  2.25  Prob > chi2 = 0.1333 
      
Notes.  */**/*** significance at 1%. 5%. 10%. respectively. 
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TABLE 4. Results for Estimated Standard Deviation of the 
Disturbance Term 
 
Repeat-sales Price Index  Selection Corrected Repeat-
Sales Price Index 
Mean  Std. Dev.  Coefficient  Std. Dev. 
0.1942031 0.0525362 0.1770209 0.0507846 
   19
 
TABLE 5. Results for Width of the Confidence Interval 
 
Repeat-sales Price Index  Selection Corrected Repeat-Sales 
Price Index 
Mean Min  Max Mean Min Max 
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